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A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE: 
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 
HowARD L. KRoNGowt 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores some of the differences between the common law 
and civilian legal systems with respect to the admission of relevant 
evidence in criminal trials. Two types of evidentiary barriers to admis-
sion are considered: barriers to the admission of evidence that are 
believed to impede the fact-finding process, and barriers to admission 
imposed for reasons extraneous to the fact-finding process. The former 
are explored through a comparative analysis of the admission and use 
of derivative (hearsay) evidence. The latter are explored through a 
discussion of the exclusionary mechanisms available for evidence ob-
tained as a result of improper searches and seizures in jive countries: 
England, Canada, and the United States (from the common law tradi-
tion), and France and Germany (from the civil law tradition). This 
article contends that the dangers of reliance on derivative evidence are 
generally guarded against in both legal systems, although it is the 
structure and functioning of civilian courts, rather than formal rules of 
evidence, that have this effect in civil law jurisdictions. This article also 
contends that, unlike the treatment of derivative evidence, the mecha-
nisms for excluding evidence obtained as a result of an improper search 
and seizure are not closely tied to the legal system in use in a jurisdic-
tion, but rather to other aspects of a country's legal and constitutional 
structure. 
t Howard L. Krongold, B.A. (Hons.), is a second-year student at Dalhousie Law School. The 
author wishes to thank Professor Bruce Archibald of Dalhousie Law School for his advice and 
encouragement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
All fonnal systems for the adjudication of criminal offences involve the 
development of what can be called a "truth narrative," 1 that is, a story 
about the events in question that is accepted by the adjudicator(s) as 
reflecting fact for the purposes of the proceeding. It is on the basis of this 
narrative that the case before a tribunal is usually disposed. While 
numerous arguments can be made about the possibility of constructing 
an objectively accurate truth narrative, the development of a narrative 
that purports to reflect the truth is undoubtedly at the core of formal 
adjudication in modern legal systems, especially where the case con-
cerns criminal liability. 
With the exception of certain facts for which proof is not required -
for example, in the common law world in the case of judicial notice2 or 
conceded facts3 the truth narrative is developed through evidence. For 
efficiency, and to guard against the confusion of issues, evidence is 
limited to that information which is relevant to a fact in issue, i.e. 
information that contributes to the truth narrative by tending to establish 
that a fact in issue is more or less likely to have occurred.4 
The bulk of the work of an adjudicative body in criminal trials 
involves the resolution of contentious facts. Insofar as evidence is the 
means by which these facts are resolved by contributing to the develop-
ment of the truth narrative, it is perhaps initially surprising that various 
rules exist to exclude evidence which is logically probative to a fact in 
issue. This paper will explore two of these exclusionary tendencies in 
the common law and civil law. 
1 In some cases it might be more accurate to describe the development of truth narratives; for 
example, the common law does not demand that jurors in a judge and jury trial all accept the 
same version of the facts, so long as each accepts a version sutlicient to establish the guilt of 
the accused: see i11fi·a note 7. 
2 See J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman, & A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d. ed. 
(Toronto: Butterwo1ihs, 1999) at 1055 [Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant]. Note that the charac-
teristics of the common law criminal trial will ollen refer to Canadian authorities as examples 
of the common law approach. 
3 Ibid. at I 054-1055; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 655. 
4 See J.W. Strong, ed., McCormick 011 Evidence, 5th ed., vol. 1 (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing:, 1999) at 636-637 [McCormick 011 Evidence - vol. I]. 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ... 99 
Following the analytical approach outlined by Damaska5 I will 
accept for the purposes of this paper that two different categories of 
exclusionary rules exist for relevant evidence: i) rules excluding evi-
dence which it is believed would tend to impede the fact-finding pro-
cess, and ii) rules excluding evidence for reasons unrelated to the 
evidence's truth-finding value. In regard to the former kind of exclu-
sion, I will specifically consider the treatment of hearsay evidence (as it 
is known in the common law world). In regard to the latter kind of 
exclusion I will consider the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result 
of illegal searches and seizures. 
While it is arguably true that there is something to be learned from 
other traditions with regard to the efficacy of the truth finding process, I 
will not enter into that debate in this paper. I am prevented from 
pursuing that kind of analysis by the lack of any universally acceptable 
objective criteria or process for determining objective truth to which one 
can compare the results attainable under each system. The legal method 
is the nearest method we have for making determinations about truth (at 
least on a societal basis); to adopt any other method (for example, a 
more "scientific" approach) would merely shift the point of contention. 
I feel obliged to note that this paper relies much more heavily on 
secondary sources than is preferable. Unfortunately, the nature of com-
parative legal analysis is that the scope is, of necessity, broad, and as a 
result, the potential primary sources are practically innumerable. Sec-
ondary sources are necessary in this type of analysis to overcome the 
problems of language and the number of potentially relevant primary 
materials, to say nothing of issues of accessibility to foreign primary 
texts. I hope that my broad conceptual approach to understanding the 
differences in evidentiary rules and practices will ensure that this analy-
sis is valuable, notwithstanding the inevitable inaccuracies that occur 
when examining sources which are themselves synthetic in their ap-
proach and unavoidably out of date. 
Finally, I must note that this paper will be addressing only the 
exclusion of relevant evidence, without undertaking any serious analy-
sis of what "relevance" means. As noted above, under common law 
5 M. Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: 
A Comparative Study" (1973), 121 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 506 at 513 [Damaska, ··Evidentiary 
Barriers"]. 
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systems evidence is relevant if it has the tendency to increase or de-
crease the probability of a fact in issue. The materials I canvassed do not 
suggest there are significant differences between the civil law and 
common law when assessing relevance. Nonetheless, it should be noted 
the scope of this paper is limited in this regard. Further, the basic 
threshold issue ofrelevance is presumed in the analyses below. 
II. THE ADJUDICATIVE CONTEXT OF CIVILIAN AND COMMON 
LAW COURTS: STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES 
An appreciation of the basic structure and functioning of the fact-
finding processes in common law and civil law jurisdictions is integral 
to understanding the evidentiary exclusionary rules of each system. This 
structure and functioning has shaped the rules of evidence; understand-
ing the adjudicative bodies dominant in each system is invaluable to 
assist the foreigner in understanding the admissibility of evidence. 
In common law jurisdictions, evidence law has developed around 
the judge and jury model of adjudication. In this model the judge alone 
decides questions of law, while a lay jury of twelve is charged with 
making factual determinations and deciding whether the guilt of the 
accused has been proven.6 While the rules of evidence are, at least 
theoretically, applied in the same way when a judge sits alone, the laws 
of evidence are tailored to fit the jury trial. 
While the jury in a judge and jury trial is referred to as the "finder of 
fact," it is appropriate to distinguish the activity of the jury as finder of 
fact from a judge as finder of fact in judge-alone trials. Unlike judge-
alone trials, where the judge makes determinations about the facts of the 
case and then considers whether the facts accepted establish the guilt of 
the accused, jurors are not required to make the same findings of fact to 
convict an accused. While each juror must be convinced of the guilt of 
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that they 
agree on what facts have been proven, provided each juror accepts a 
6 Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997) at 
436-437 [Quigley]. 
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version of the facts that sufficiently establishes the elements of the 
offence.7 
The nexus between the judge and jury in a mixed common law trial 
is that aside from controlling the procedural aspects of the trial, the 
judge also gives the jury instructions about the law they are required to 
apply.8 In relation to evidence specifically, the judge is empowered to 
admit or exclude evidence and to warn the jury about the weight they 
may give admissible but unreliable or potentially unduly prejudicial 
evidence.9 Significantly, if the admissibility of evidence is challenged, 
the judge alone, without the presence of the jury, considers the evidence 
and its admissibility. If the evidence is excluded the jury is never 
exposed to it. Aside from knowing that a matter has been decided out of 
their presence, the jury is effectively made unaware of the existence of 
the impugned evidence. 10 
The prevailing adjudicative process in civil law jurisdictions - par-
ticularly for serious criminal charges is the "unified" or "mixed" 
bench where professional judges sit along-side a greater number of lay 
jurors. 11 Most significantly for evidence law the voir dire, where a judge 
has an opportunity to assess and consider the admissibility of impugned 
evidence without the presence of the lay jury, does not exist in civil law 
jurisdictions. 12 
The civilian system has also adopted an inquisitorial, as opposed to 
adversarial, approach to adjudication. At trial the presiding judge is 
appointed with the task of calling and examining witnesses and present-
ing the evidence discovered in the investigation by the examining 
magistrate. Parties to the litigation may suggest questions for witnesses 
to the presiding judge, but their role is minimal. 13 
7 See in Canada e.g. R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345 at para. 36. In any case, the fact that the 
jury does not give reasons for its verdict makes it practically impossible to ensure that each 
juror has reaches their conclusions by the same route. 
8 Quigley, supra note 6 at 436-437, 438-439. 
9 See e.g. R. v. A. (S.) (1992), 17 C.R. (4th) 233, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 522 (Ont. C.A.) [R. v. A. cited 
to C.R.]; R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] I S.C.R. 811. 
10 M. Damaska, "Of Hearsay and Its Analogues" (1992), 76 Minn. L. Rev. 425 at 427-428 
[Damaska, "Of Hearsay"]. 
11 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 510-511 
12 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 510. 
13 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 525. 
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In the civil law system the evidence gathered during the investiga-
tion is collected in the dossier. The dossier is a documentary record of 
the investigation. Indeed, the trial is as much a public presentation of the 
content of the dossier, through calling witnesses and having them con-
finn their statement as recorded in the dossier, as it is about the determi-
nation of guilt. This is not to say that the trial is merely for show, but 
rather that it reflects less emphasis on the trial as the site where the guilt 
of the accused is determined. 14 
Another important difference between common law and civilian 
systems, with respect to the development of evidentiary rules and prac-
tices, is the nature of appellate review. Common law comis show great 
deference to the factual findings made at trial. 15 Appeal courts will 
generally only consider questions of law, except where the factual 
findings of the trial comi are deemed to have been patently unreasonable 
or unsupportable by the evidence. 16 While in criminal cases there is 
generally a greater degree of appellate review than in other contexts, the 
limited scope of this review makes the trial of utmost importance. In 
contrast, civilian law appeals provide a trial de nova, and the appellate 
court is empowered to reach a different finding of fact than the original 
trial courts without deciding the original finding of fact was unreason-
able. As well, the trial court is required to provide written justifications 
for their findings of fact. This clarifies the evidentiary basis for the 
factual findings at trial, which facilitates judicial review of the factual 
findings on appeal. 17 
The result of these differences is that the common law places a 
greater emphasis than civilian law on the trial itself. The importance of 
guarding against an improper finding of fact at trial is therefore of 
greater significance in the common law, where the opportunity to dis-
turb those findings on review is more limited. 
14 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 450; Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 
5 at 544. See also generally Richard J. Terrill, "France" in World Criminal Justice Systems 
(Cincinnati: Anderson, 1997). 
15 See e.g. R. v. W.(R)., [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122 [R.W.]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 448-449. 
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III. THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS BELIEVED TO 
IMPEDE THE FACT-FINDING PROCESS 
1. Conceptual Differences Governing the Exclusion of Evidence 
In common law jurisdictions, the admission of evidence is considered a 
discrete subject of law. In contrast, civilian jurisdictions approach the 
use of evidence as a procedural matter. These superficial distinctions in 
the categorization of the subject of evidentiary rules allude to a more 
profound distinction between the approach of the common law system 
and the civil law system, particularly with respect to evidentiary barriers 
intended to improve fact-finding accuracy. 
In the common law world the use of evidence is governed by a 
system of formalized rules for admissibility. The trend in many common 
law countries in recent years has been to reduce the number and com-
plexity of these rules, or at least supplement them with an alternative 
"principled" approach to the exclusion of evidence. 18 Regardless of 
whether a strict or flexible rule is applied, the process of determining 
admissibility begins with characterizing the evidence based on formal 
categories, such as hearsay evidence, character evidence, or evidence of 
credibility. 
In contrast, civilian law rejects the categorical approach of the 
common law, and particularly the creation of absolute, or even presump-
tive, exclusionary rules. 19 While this contrast between the common law 
and civil law makes it seem as though the two systems are simply 
incommensurable, the civil law seems to recognize the potential for 
certain evidence to dist01i the fact-finding process in much the same 
way that the common law system does. Ultimately, however, it deals 
with such evidence in different ways. Rather than excluding evidence 
which may distort the fact-finding process by way of exclusionary rules, 
the structure and function of the civilian courts results in such evidence 
not being called. Where it is called, undue reliance on such evidence is 
mitigated. It is helpful at this point to examine an example of evidence 
which may distort the fact-finding process. 
18 See e.g. the discussion of the development of the residual exception to the hearsay rule, 
below. 
19 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 514. 
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2. Hearsay Evidence 
i. Common Law 
In the common law world "hearsay" evidence refers to means of proof 
which are derivative. It essentially excludes the admission of statements 
to prove the facts stated therein unless that statement is made by a 
person while giving oral evidence in the same proceeding.20 The quint-
essential example is the recitation by an in-court witness of a statement 
made by an out-of-court declarant, used to prove the truth of the con-
tents of the declarant's statement.21 Hearsay also extends to written 
statements, as when a document is introduced which provides a written 
record of the author's first hand observations ("single hearsay"), or 
where a document is introduced which records statements made by a 
first-hand observer written by another ("double hearsay"). 
Both common law and civil law jurisdictions recognize the danger 
ofrelying upon derivative means of proof. Roman-canon law, dominant 
on the European continent until the l 81h century, provided explicit rules 
for the exclusion of many forms of derivative evidence, and exceptions 
there from, similar in practice to those which continue to exist in 
common law jurisdictions.22 Notwithstanding these similar legal tradi-
tions with respect to derivative proof however, the modern continental 
approach is, at least conceptually, quite different from that used in 
common law jurisdictions. 
As is the case generally in evidence law, the traditional common law 
approach to hearsay focussed on the categorical exclusion of derivative 
evidence, qualified by numerous exceptions.23 More recently some com-
mon law jurisdictions have moved toward a "principles-based" ap-
proach (often called the "residual exception") to the admission of hear-
say evidence which does not fit into one of the traditional exceptions.24 
In the United States this has occurred through amendments to the 
20 See C. Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 9th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1999) at 530 
[Tapper]. 
21 The evidence of the original declarant will sometimes be referred to as "primary evidence" 
to distinguish it from derivative evidence. 
22 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 434-441 . 
23 The traditional approach still dominates in England. See Tapper, supra note 20 c. XIII, XV. 
24 England is a notable exception in this regard. See Tapper, supra note 20 at 538. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular Rule 807.25 With the exception 
of the notice requirements provided for in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Canadian courts have developed essentially the same principled 
approach through the judicial development of the common law.26 This 
approach allows the admission of hearsay evidence where it is consid-
ered necessary and the evidence exhibits circumstantial guarantees of 
reliability. 
McCormick states that the analysis of reliability is very fact specific 
but notes the following factors as often relevant: motivation of the 
declarant to speak the truth or lie; spontaneity of the statement, includ-
ing whether leading questions were asked; time lapse between the event 
and the statement describing it; whether the statement was under oath; 
whether the declarant was cross-examined as to the statement; the 
relationship between the declarant and the witness; whether the 
declarant subsequently recanted or affirmed the statement; whether the 
statement was recorded (particularly videotaped); and whether the 
declarant's firsthand knowledge was clearly demonstrated.27 Canadian 
courts have adopted these same factors in their assessment of circum-
stantial guarantees of reliability. 28 Both jurisdictions also seem to have 
excluded the existence of corroborative evidence as a factor showing 
reliability,29 although not all U.S. Courts have been faithful in following 
this doctrine.3° Further, the Supreme Court of Canada's stance on the 
issue seems tenuous, given that the Court has specifically relied on 
corroborative evidence to show reliability in early residual exception 
cases. 31 
The effect of the residual exception on hearsay law in some common 
law countries should not be underestimated. However, it is equally 
important to realize that this trend leaves the categorical exclusion of 
hearsay evidence conceptually intact, and admission of hearsay evi-
dence under the principled approach is properly conceived of as an 
25 Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § l, 88 Stat. 1948 (1975). 
26 See for e.g., R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 [Starr]. 
27 See J.W. Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence, 5th ed., vol. 2 (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing, 1999) at 345-346 [McKormick on Evidence vol. 2]. 
28 See e.g. R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 [Khan]; R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915; R. v. B. 
(K.G.), [1993] I S.C.R. 740; and especially R. v. A., supra note 9. 
29 Jn U.S. see: McKormick on Evidence vol. 2, supra note 27 at 347, citing Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805 ( 1990). In Canada see Starr, supra note 26 at para. 217. 
30 McKormick on Evidence vol. 2, supra note 27 at 347-348. 
31 See Khan, supra note 28; and R. v. U. (F.J.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764. 
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exception to the hearsay rule: hearsay evidence is still inadmissible 
unless it can be shown to conform with the requirements imposed by a 
traditional hearsay exception or the principles-based approach. 
Numerous reasons are proposed for the existence of the hearsay rule, 
and the justifications for its existence change as courts adapt to chang-
ing notions of fairness and efficacious truth-finding. Two of the most 
commonly cited, traditional justifications are the oath and the ability of 
the trier of fact to assess witness credibility by the witness' presence at 
trial. 32 Another oft-cited factor is a distrust of a jury's ability to properly 
assess hearsay evidence in light of its inherent weaknesses.33 Other 
concerns include the danger of relying upon the ability of an in-court 
witness to accurately replicate the statements of an out-of-court 
declarant,34 the possibility of unfair surprise to opposing counsel, who 
would not be able to anticipate the evidence that might be given by a 
witness,35 and the potential for abuse of governmental power by allow-
ing the prosecution to rely upon "professional witnesses" (such as 
investigating police officers) to present its case.36 
The dominant modern justification for the hearsay rule is that hear-
say makes meaningful cross-examination of the witness impossible. As 
the in-court witness can only be challenged as to his or her honesty, 
capacity for accurate recollection, and proper interpretation of the state-
ments, the opposing party is usually unable to meaningfully impugn the 
contents of the statement offered. When hearsay evidence is used, the 
opposing party is often unable to meaningfully test the perception, 
memory, narration, and sincerity of the declarant. These factors are 
considered the four primary dangers of relying upon hearsay evidence. 37 
As cross-examination is recognized as a foundational aspect of the 
adversarial system and has been famously lauded as the "greatest engine 
32 McKormick on Evidence vol. 2, supra note 27 at 93-95; and discussion in R. v. B. (K.G.), 
[1993] I S.C.R. 740. 
33 R. Park, "A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform" ( 1987), 86 Mich. L. Rev. 51 at 56 
[Park, "Hearsay Reform"]. 
34 Ibid. at 56. 
35 Park, "Hearsay Reform", supra note 33 at 63. 
·11' Park, "Hearsay Reform", supra note 33 at 65-66. 
37 See McKormick on Evidence vol. 2, supra note 27 at 93. These four dangers were 
recognized by E.M. Morgan in his landmark article "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of 
the Hearsay Concept" ( 1948) 62 Harvard L. Rev. 177. 
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ever invented for the discovery of truth,"38 it is considered essential to a 
fair trial. 39 
ii. Civil Law 
In contrast to the common law, civilian jurisdictions have rejected the 
categorical approach to exclusion. Instead, the civil law merely ex-
presses a preference for primary evidence over derivative evidence.40 
This preference has been expressed as the equivalent of the "best 
evidence rule" in the common law, but extends to all types of evidence.41 
It is perhaps not surprising at first glance that hearsay is not categori-
cally excluded in civilian jurisdictions, considering that civilian law 
provides no analogue for cross-examination, and the inability to cross-
examine upon hearsay evidence is the dominant justification for the rule 
in the common law world. However, even absent concerns about the 
inability of opposing counsel to meaningfully cross-examine a hearsay 
witness, many of the justifications for the exclusion of derivative evi-
dence are equally applicable in civilian trials as those in the common 
law. Indeed, the dangers of using derivative means of proof are recog-
nized in civil law, although the response has been notably different as a 
result of a number of factors. 
Given that the dangers of derivative evidence are recognized in 
civilian trials, the lack of a rule excluding hearsay evidence seems 
unusual. However, this can be attributed broadly to the structural and 
functional characteristics of civilian criminal courts. These structural 
and functional factors can be divided into two main categories: factors 
which make categorical exclusion inappropriate or inefficient, and fac-
tors which result in either avoidance of derivative evidence by the 
tribunal or mitigate its undesirable effects. 
38 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 5 (Boston: Little Brown, 1940) at 
32. 
39 See e.g. R. v. O.rnlin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 at paras. 157-160. 
40 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 446. 
41 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 517. Interestingly, prior to the widespread 
acceptance of Thayer's theory that relevance is the guiding principle behind evidence law in 
the common law world it was proposed that a "best evidence rule" should serve this function. 
See W. Twining, Rethinking Evidence (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990) at I 88-189. 
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One of the most important factors in civilian law which makes a 
categorical hearsay rule impractical is the use of a unitary bench. The 
unitary bench, where lay jurors and professional judges sit together on 
all issues, including the admissibility of evidence, would tend to make 
the exclusion of hearsay evidence an artificial construction. The adjudi-
cators would be required to hear the impugned evidence and then rule on 
its admissibility. An adverse ruling on admissibility would require the 
panel to disregard the evidence, which is considered both impractical 
and unrealistic. Moreover, many civilian observers view disregarding 
evidence as an indirect imposition of rules for the evaluation of evi-
dence. Such a system was used under the Roman-canon law system, to 
much criticism; it was believed to result in mechanistic and unjust 
adjudication. To involve a judge otherwise unconnected with the case at 
trial, to hear and decide admissibility issues when they arise, is consid-
ered inefficient, impractical and ultimately undesirable.42 
Another imp01tant structural difference that makes the categorical 
exclusion of hearsay evidence impractical is the importance of the pre-
trial dossier in the civilian system. Using the common law understand-
ing of derivative evidence, a large part of a pre-trial dossier would 
constitute hearsay, yet it is critical that at least the presiding judge be 
conversant with its contents to be able to competently call evidence and 
examine witnesses.43 The very nature of the dossier-based system re-
quires that the questioner be exposed to derivative evidence. Once 
again, it would be impossible and artificial to suppose that the judge 
might read hearsay evidence in the dossier, then disregard that same 
evidence if it were deemed inadmissible at trial.44 
Although the structure and function of the civilian trial makes a 
categorical hearsay rule impractical, there are a number of facets of the 
civilian trial that limit the use of hearsay evidence or mitigate its 
undesirable effect. Among the most important of these is the non-
partisan nature of the proceedings, wherein the judiciary controls the 
presentation of evidence. A number of results relevant to the admission 
of derivative evidence flow from this fact. 
·12 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 445-446. 
4> Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 450-451. 
44 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 45 I. 
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Firstly, judicial control of proceedings means there is less concern 
about the partisanship of witnesses. Witnesses are viewed as basically 
neutral, rather than as "prosecution witnesses" or "defence witnesses," 
which tends to make the reliability of evidence less suspect.45 Secondly, 
as noted above, witnesses who give inculpatory evidence are not cross-
examined by the accused's counsel. As a result, the inability to mean-
ingfully challenge the witness on the accuracy of the derivative state-
ments provided seems less detrimental to trial fairness. 46 Thirdly, the 
court is able to call evidence in the manner considered most appropriate, 
rather than hearing the presentation of evidence in the order deemed 
most desirable by the parties. Admissible derivative evidence may be 
followed immediately by testimony of the original declarant, thereby 
addressing the concern that derivative evidence may be misunderstood 
or given undue weight by a tribunal unaware of the full context of the 
declarant's observations.47 
In addition to the judicial control of proceedings, civilian law miti-
gates against the unrestrained acceptance of hearsay evidence via the 
principle of immediacy and the structure and scope of judicial review. 
The principle of immediacy, the lesser of these two guards against 
derivative means of proof, essentially requires direct contact between 
the adjudicators and their sources of information. While to the common 
law lawyer, such a requirement may seem to directly import a prohibi-
tion of hearsay evidence, the rule is generally not understood so broadly 
in civilian law. The rule was introduced to remedy the perceived injus-
tice of the Roman-canon law system, which in its twilight years saw 
cases resolved by judges who did not have a direct investigatory role; 
instead, they were simply briefed of the relevant evidence by a subordi-
nate. The result was that cases were decided without direct observation 
of any of the witnesses by the adjudicator.48 
The rule of immediacy was designed to put an end to these deriva-
tive adjudications; therefore it has generally been narrowly interpreted 
to prohibit only official bureaucratic mediation of the evidence to the 
adjudicator.49 Nonetheless, the principle of immediacy is sometimes 
45 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 431. 
46 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 433. 
47 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 433. 
48 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 446-447. 
49 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 446-447. 
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relied on in both academic commentary and courts as requiring the 
presentation of primary evidence wherever possible. 50 While the prin-
ciple continues to be of only subsidiary importance in most civilian 
jurisdictions, it is statutorily applied in Italy, where Art. 195 of the 
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure contains a prohibition of hearsay 
evidence except where strictly necessary.51 Because of the scope of the 
Italian procedural reforms, this anomaly will not be examined in depth 
in this paper. It is nonetheless noteworthy that in Italy, the broader 
reading of the principle of immediacy as an exclusionary rule has been 
adopted to seemingly dramatic effect. 
Outside of Italy, the preference for primary evidence is principally 
enforced through the structure and functioning of the judicial review 
process. Damaska notes that civilian judges are required to provide 
reasoned opinions in which they specify their factual findings and the 
bases for those findings. 52 As noted above, appellate review is readily 
available in criminal cases, and appellate judges show very little defer-
ence to factual findings at trial. Appellate courts will overturn trial court 
rulings if they consider the evidentiary basis for those findings to be 
insufficient. Derivative evidence is a recognized source of such an error 
unless the derivative statements are supported by circumstantial guaran-
tees ofreliability, as is the case in some common law countries. 53 
Mitigation of hearsay dangers is also achieved through appellate 
review because civilian judges are responsible for ensuring a compre-
hensive and accurate evidentiary record sufficient to prove guilt at 
trial. 54 A judge who refuses to call the original declarant (where avail-
able) of a statement which provides the only strong evidence of an 
important and material fact is likely to be overruled on review. Even in 
cases where the declarant is unavailable, convictions have been reversed 
where the only evidence conclusive of guilt is derivative and circum-
stantial guarantees of reliability are too weak to support conviction. 55 
50 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 447-448, 11. 63. 
51 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note 10 at 447-448, 11. 63. 
52 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 448. 
53 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 448-49. 
54 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 454. 
55 Damaska, "Of Hearsay", supra note I 0 at 456. 
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iii. Common Law and Civil Law in Comparison 
The residual exception to the hearsay rule in some common law jurisdic-
tions shows an understandable concern that hearsay evidence should be 
both necessary and reliable in order to be admissible. Both common law 
and civilian jurisdictions provide their own legal or structural/functional 
guarantees in this regard. 
With regard to ensuring that hearsay evidence is only given where it 
is necessary, both systems offer similar guarantees. In common law 
jurisdictions both the rule and its exceptions generally tend to ensure 
that derivative evidence is only given when the original declarant is 
either absolutely unavailable or cannot reasonably give the relevant 
testimony (exceptions to this tendency exist, such as admissions by an 
accused). In civilian law the principle that hearsay evidence is only used 
where necessary is ensured through the commonsense operation of the 
inquisitorial system and the need for reasoned justifications of judg-
ments. In particular, the principle that the examining magistrate is 
responsible for ensuring a comprehensive and accurate evidentiary 
record ensures that derivative evidence will only be acceptable where 
the declarant is unavailable. 
In terms of reliability the two systems are more markedly different. 
The common law requires a finding by the trial judge of threshold 
reliability through circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness before 
the evidence goes before the jury, whereas the civilian law offers no 
such protections against the admission of unreliable hearsay. However, 
while the common law ensures that a basic level of reliability is shown 
for hearsay evidence, there are in this area, (as is generally the case in 
the common law), no rules guiding the weight to be given such evi-
dence. Subject to the power of a judge to substitute a verdict or an appeal 
court to substitute a finding of fact (both of which are unusual and 
extraordinary remedies) the jury is free to rely heavily on derivative 
evidence if they so choose. The only common guarantee against this is 
the warning by the trial judge as to the danger of relying solely upon 
derivative evidence. 
In civilian systems there is no formal mechanism for excluding 
unreliable derivative evidence. Presumably in flagrant cases of 
unreliability such evidence would not be elicited by the presiding judge. 
But generally, derivative evidence will be admitted regardless of its 
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reliability, and it will go unsupported where the declarant is unavailable. 
However, the civil law provides more opportunity for appellate review 
of factual decisions. The result is that while questionable derivative 
evidence is probably more likely to be admitted in civilian jurisdictions, 
there is a greater potential for such evidence to be unduly relied upon at 
a common law trial. While the judiciary in common law jurisdictions 
exercises strong control over the admission of evidence, there is no 
significant control over the weight to be given to such evidence. As 
such, there appears to be a greater danger that a common law jury will 
unduly rely upon hearsay evidence which exhibits only the minimal 
threshold reliability, whereas a civilian tribunal would likely face higher 
hurdles on review if it based a decision solely or significantly on such 
evidence. In terms of the ultimate decision of the tribunal, the civilian 
system seems to provide stronger guarantees that derivative evidence 
will not be unduly relied upon. 
IV. EVIDENTIARY BARRIERS IMPOSED FOR REASONS 
EXTRANEOUS TO TRUTH-FINDING 
It has been argued above that the exclusionary rules and practices for 
evidence excluded purely due to concerns that it will distort fact-finding 
are largely a result of the structure and functioning of the criminal 
tiibunal. Because such tribunals operate primarily in the same manner 
across national boundaries, the primary indicia of variability is the type 
of legal system used in a jurisdiction (i.e. common law or civil law). In 
contrast, the exclusion of evidence for reasons extraneous to truth 
finding reflects a society's prioritization of certain values over accurate 
truth finding. Such exclusion is therefore more subject to variance 
within a legal tradition than are exclusionary practices that arise out of 
concerns about distortion of the fact-finding process. 
The category of evidence excluded for reasons extraneous to truth-
finding accuracy encompasses a huge range of potential evidentiary 
barriers, ranging from the protection of certain communications to the 
fruits of illegal state action. 
This section will focus on the admission of evidence from illegal 
searches and seizures. Unlike other kinds of evidence obtained illegally 
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(for example, evidence obtained through involuntary confessions or 
deprivation of legal counsel) evidence obtained through illegal search 
and seizure can rarely be impugned due to unreliability or because it 
would otherwise distort the fact-finding process. As such, it provides a 
relatively pure comparator to the type of evidentiary exclusion dis-
cussed in the first part of this paper. 
For simplicity I will only consider the admissibility of illegally 
obtained evidence at the formal trial, where the guilt of the accused is 
detennined (as opposed to at bail or other proceedings), and only with 
respect to evidence obtained illegally in violation of the rights of the 
accused (as opposed to the rights of uncharged third parties). 
Because the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence differs dra-
matically across national boundaries, this section will focus on the 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in five countries: England, 
Canada, and the United States (from the common law tradition), and 
France and Gennany (from the civil law tradition). 
1. The Common Law World 
The basic legal rights recognized in Canada, the United States and 
England are all held in common, and indeed are said to be derived from 
the common law tradition. Nonetheless, each country has adopted sig-
nificantly different approaches to the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence. In each case, the exclusionary rnles adopted reflect different 
understandings of the reasons for the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence. These reasons in turn reflect the unique experience of each 
nation, particularly in regard to the regulation of the relationship be-
tween citizens and the state. 
It is noteworthy that in Canada and the United States national 
constitutional minimum standards exist for obtaining evidence by 
search and seizure. Searches and seizures which fall below these consti-
tutional minimums are obviously illegal. However, in these jurisdictions 
a search and seizure can be illegal by virtue of violating another statute 
(or state constitution in the U.S.) which sets standards for conducting 
searches and seizures higher than those mandated by the federal consti-
tution. Therefore, these jurisdictions potentially have two kinds of ille-
gally obtained evidence from a search and seizure: evidence which is 
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obtained in contravention of the constitutional minimum standards, and 
evidence which is obtained without violating constitutional standards, 
yet is illegal by virtue of violating another rule of law. Hence, there are 
potentially two kinds of remedies for addressing such evidence. This 
section will focus on the exclusion of evidence which is obtained 
illegally by virtue of falling below constitutional minimum standards in 
countries where such constitutional minimum standards exist. This 
approach is adopted both for simplicity and because the case for the 
exclusion of evidence as a result of a constitutionally impermissible 
search is obviously more compelling. The justifications for such exclu-
sions are therefore more interesting for comparative purposes. 
i. England 
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in England is dealt with 
through the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 56 The treaty has been a guiding force in 
English jurisprudence since it came into effect in 1953, and in 1998, it 
became incorporated into English domestic law by the Human Rights 
Act 1998. 57 Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is also dealt with 
under s. 78( 1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.58 That 
section reads: 
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which 
the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court 
that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circum-
stances in which the evidence was obtained, the evidence would have 
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court 
ought not to admit it. 
Prior to the enactment of s. 78( 1 ), the English approach was to admit 
illegally obtained evidence, subject to exclusion in narrowly defined 
circumstances that involved a reference to an inadmissible confession of 
guilt, or evidence obtained by an act in contempt of comi. 59 
56 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. 5 (entered into force 5 September 1953) 
[Convent ion]. 
57 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 [Human Rights Act I 998]. 
58 (U.K.), 1984, c. 60. 
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As A. L.-T. Choo and S. Nash explain,60 while the early jurispru-
dence interpreting s. 78(1) tended towards excluding illegally obtained 
evidence, recent decisions suggest that the fact evidence has been 
illegally obtained is in most instances insufficient to ensure its exclu-
sion, or even confer discretion on the trial judge to decide whether to 
admit the evidence. Choo and Nash point out that while early cases 
indicated that "significant and substantial breaches" of the law will 
heavily favour exclusion of the evidence obtained even absent bad faith 
by the police, recent judgments are concerned only with the reliability of 
the illegally obtained evidence in determining whether it is admissible. 61 
Choo and Nash point to the Court of Appeal decision in Chalkley62 
which suggests that illegally obtained evidence cannot be excluded to 
signify judicial disapproval of the way in which it has been obtained. 
The judgment suggests that the only basis for exclusion of such evi-
dence is unreliability.63 Choo and Nash remark that Chalkley is by no 
means unique, noting that the Court's approach is similar to that of the 
Court of Appeal in an earlier decision: Cooke. 64 In that case the Court 
held that, arguendo, even if impugned evidence is deemed to be illegally 
obtained, if the illegality does not cast doubt on the reliability of that 
evidence it is not subject to exclusion. In its ruling the Court distin-
guished illegally obtained real evidence from illegally obtained confes-
sions which, it was suggested, were ripe for exclusion because of 
concerns about reliability. 65 
Of particular significance in the English context is the movement 
away from the discretionary exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
that the decision in Chalkley reflects. In a decision prior to Chalkley, the 
House of Lords in Khan (Sultan)66 suggested that exclusion of evidence 
pursuant to s. 78(1) might be engaged at the discretion of the trial judge 
59 Tapper, supra note 20 at 500-501. 
60 A. L.-T. Choo and S. Nash, "The Exclusion of Improperly Obtained Evidence in England 
and Wales: a Continuing Saga" in C.M. Breur et. al. eds., Neiv Trends· in Criminal Investiga-
tion and Evidence (Oxford: lntersentia, 2000) at 127-140 [Choo & Nash]. 
61 Ibid. at 128-129. 132-134. 
62 [J 998] 2 All. E.R. 155. 
63 Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 132-133. 
64 [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 318. 
65 Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 132. 
66 [1996] All E.R. 289. 
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when a breach of the Convention had been established. 67 In contrast to 
the House of Lords decision in Khan (Sultan), which still only conferred 
narrow and discretionary exclusion power to trial judges, the decision in 
Chalkley suggests that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is imper-
missible unless the reliability of that evidence is undermined. In any 
event, as Choo and Nash note, both cases clearly reflect the commitment 
of the English judiciary to reliability as the chief indicia of admissibility 
for illegally obtained evidence. 68 
To explain this narrow approach to s. 78(1 ), Choo and Nash observe 
that the English judiciary has approached the protection of trial fairness 
in s. 78(1) as a guarantee of procedural fairness for the accused in the 
case at bar, as opposed to a broader approach of protecting the fairness 
of the trial for the accused qua representative citizen. 69 The English 
judiciary's concerns about fairness in determining the admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence extend no further than protecting the ac-
cused against wrongful conviction from the admission of unreliable, 
illegally obtained evidence. This is in contrast to Canadian and Ameri-
can courts, which have (at least in part) deemed the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence to be a reflection of the extent of the 
judiciary's commitment to the protection of the legal rights of all 
residents and the integrity of the administration of justice. 
English law seems to have adopted reliability as the only factor 
relevant to deciding the admissibility of evidence under s. 78(1 ). This 
trend could be reversed or altered by the adoption of the Convention into 
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998.70 The effect of this Act is 
still uncertain as it did not come fully into force until October, 2000. 
However, it seems unlikely that the Convention will significantly alter 
the state of the English law surrounding the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence. There are three reasons for this. 
Firstly, the Convention has been a guiding force in the development 
of domestic English law since it came into force as an international 
treaty in 1953. It was already considered by the courts when they 
67 Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 134-135. 
68 Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 135. This is the same approach that was adopted in Canada 
under the prior to the introduction of the Charter, infra note 74. See. R. v. Wray, inji-a note 73. 
69 Choo & Nash, supra note 60 at 139-140. 
70 Human Rights Act 1998. supra note 57. 
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developed the current approach to s. 78(1). 71 Secondly, recent criminal 
jurisprudence suggests that the adoption of the Convention into domes-
tic law is not generating any dramatic effects with regard to the interpre-
tation of legal rights in other areas of criminal law.72 Thirdly, the 
Convention does not speak directly to the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence, and it seems unlikely to substantially affect the treatment of 
illegally obtained evidence where s. 78(1) (which has provided an 
obvious opportunity for the judiciary to change the traditional approach 
of the common law to illegally obtained evidence) has not. Nonetheless, 
with the adoption of the Convention into domestic law the potential for 
change arises, and it still remains to be seen whether the judiciary will 
use this opportunity to adopt a different exclusionary rule. 
ii. Canada 
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in Canada draws from 
relatively recent constitutional provisions enacted in 1982. Prior to 
1982, reliability was the guiding indicia of admissibility. 73 Now the 
exclusion or admission of such evidence occurs through the operation of 
s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,74 which forms 
part of Canada's constitution. That section reads: 
Where ... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner 
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this 
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
With respect to evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, the 
most relevant Charter guarantee is the protection afforded by s.8, which 
provides that"[ e ]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure." 
71 See above. 
72 See A. Norrie, "Criminal Justice, Judicial Interpretation, Legal Rights: On Being Sceptical 
about the Human Rights Act 1998" in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing, and A. Tomkins eds., 
Sceptical Essays in Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 261. 
73 R. v. Wray, (1971] S.C.R. 272. 
74 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, 
c. 11 [Charter]. 
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The provisions of s. 24(2) are sometimes described as a "discretion-
ary" exclusionary rule. 75 This characterization is incorrect. Notwith-
standing the deference appellate courts have shown towards the applica-
tion of s. 24(2) at trial, 76 the effect of s. 24(2) is to mandate the exclusion 
of evidence in certain cases.77 It is therefore distinguishable from truly 
discretionary remedies. 
The leading case on s. 24(2) is R. v. Stillman.78 In that case the 
Supreme Court of Canada recognized three categories of factors rel-
evant to detennining if the admission of evidence obtained in violation 
of the Charter would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: i) 
factors relating to the fairness of the trial, ii) the seriousness of the 
Charter violation, and iii) the disrepute to the administration of justice 
by excluding the improperly obtained evidence.79 In practice, the first 
factor and the last two are examined disjunctively. "Trial fairness" is 
one basis for exclusion, and showing that the seriousness of the breach 
outweighs the disrepute to the administration of justice brought on by 
exclusion is another. In either case, the onus is on the accused to show 
on a balance of probabilities that obtaining the evidence resulted in a 
Charter breach, and further, to prove that exclusion is warranted under 
s. 24(2).80 
Courts have held that where the fairness of the trial is impugned by 
the admission of improperly obtained evidence, to admit the evidence 
would always cause the administration of justice to be brought into 
disrepute; therefore, such evidence should be excluded. 81 As such, a 
finding that admission would result in an unfair trial is always fatal to 
the prosecution's attempt to admit the evidence. 
Trial unfairness, however, is only established where the violative 
evidence in question is conscriptive.82 Admissions obtained from the 
75 See e.g. J. Stribopoulos, "Lessons from the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American 
Exclusionary 
Rule Debate" (1999), 22 Boston College Int'! & Comp. L. Rev. 77 [Stribopoulos, "Lessons"]. 
76 See e.g. R. v. Dugay, [1989] S.C.R. 93 at 98, cited with approval in R. v. Stillman, [1997] 
S.C.R. 607 [Stillman]. 
77 Paciocco, D.M. and L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999) at 
207 [Pacciocco & Stuesser]. 
78 Stillman, supra note 76. 
79 Stillman supra note 76 at para. 69. 
80 Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 205. 
81 Stillman, supra note 76 at para. 72. 
82 Stillman, supra note 76 at para. 72; R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.R. 297 at para. 146. 
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accused in violation of the Charter obviously fall into this category. The 
Court determined in Stillman that conscriptive evidence also includes 
evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure that 
uses the body83 or results in the taking of bodily samples. 84 Other 
evidence obtained by search and seizure can also be excluded as 
conscriptive where it is derivative of the conscriptive evidence, i.e. it is 
discovered only as a result of other unconstitutionally obtained 
conscriptive evidence.85 The only major exception to this rule is that 
conscriptive evidence (including, most significantly, derivative evi-
dence) is still subject to admission if it is proven by the Crown on a 
balance of probabilities to have been discoverable.86 
The principle behind the "trial fairness" branch of the test under s. 
24(2) is that a fair trial requires the Crown to prove its case against the 
accused. The use of illegal conscriptive evidence violates the principle 
of fundamental justice that an accused should not be compelled to give 
evidence against him or herself. 87 
The remaining two steps of the test are best understood in conjunc-
tion. The seriousness of the Charter breach considers the conduct of the 
authorities.88 It essentially analyses police conduct resulting in the viola-
tion on a spectrum ranging from "good faith" to "blatant disregard for 
the accused's rights." A serious or flagrant violation would tend to 
recommend against admission because it would constitute judicial con-
donation of improper police practices.89 Other relevant factors include 
83 For example, taking casts of a persons body: see Stillman, supra note 76. 
84 Stillman, supra note 76 at paras. 80-98; conscriptive evidence was limited to these three 
categories in R. v. Lewis (1998), 13 C.R. (5th) 34, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. 
Davies (1998), 18 C.R. (5th) I 13, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Y.T. C.A.). 
85 Stillman, supra note 76 at para. 99; R. v. Burlingham (1997), 38 C.R. (4th) 265 
[Burlingham]. For example, in Burlingham a shotgun which was seized from the bottom of a 
river as a result of the accused's improperly obtained confession was deemed derivative of the 
confession, and therefore conscriptive for the purposes of analyzing trial fairness. The shotgun 
was not otherwise discoverable, and was therefore excluded from the trial. 
86 Stillman, supra note 76 at paras. I 02, 107. 
87 See R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 15 I; and supra note 75 at 219-220, the protection of the 
accused from imprisonment as a result of state action which violate principles of fundamental 
justice is guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter (supra note 68) which reads: "Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." 
88 Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 124; Collins v. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 56 C.R. 
(3d) 193 [Collins]. 
89 Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 124. 
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whether the breach was serious or "merely technical" and whether the 
breach was motivated by urgency or necessity, both of which will 
mitigate the seriousness of the breach.90 
The final step weighs the seriousness of the Charter violation 
against the effects exclusion would have on the reputation of the admin-
istration of justice. This analysis is premised on the perspective of an 
objective, reasonable person, and it is not intended to import the unrea-
sonable or reactionary views of the public to the exclusion of probative 
evidence, no matter how widely held. 91 It is intended to consider the 
effect of the admission of evidence of the type in question generally, not 
just in the instant circumstance. 92 It is recognized by the Court that the 
more serious the offence, and the more crucial the evidence to the 
Crown's case, the greater the possibility of disrepute from exclusion,93 
although examples exist of very important, reliable evidence being 
excluded for prosecutions of extremely serious crimes where the police 
violation has been significant.94 
Interestingly, unlike the analysis under the "trial fairness" step or the 
prevailing law in the US, where the evidence impugned pursuant to s. 
24(2) was discoverable by other (non-violative) means, this will often 
weigh in favour of exclusion, because it shows the police violation was 
unnecessary, yet it was chosen when less violative means were avail-
able.95 Paciocco and Stuesser try to reconcile the conflicting responses 
to the discoverability of the impugned evidence in the two stages of s. 
24(2) analysis by suggesting it will mitigate against admission where 
the violation occurs under circumstances when the officers knew or 
should have known of the constitutionally permissible means. It will 
mitigate in favour of admission where such means were not apparently 
available.96 
The fact that the basis for the exclusionary rule is explicitly spelled 
out in Canada makes discovering the intended effect of the exclusionary 
90 Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 229 
91 Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 126. 
92 Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 125. 
93 Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 237. 
94 Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 237; see e.g. Stillman, supra note 76; R. v. Feeney, 
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; and Burlingham, supra note 85. 
95 Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 124-125; Collins, supra note 88 at 285, cited with 
approval in Stillman, supra note 76 at para. l 05. 
96 Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 77 at 235. 
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rule both easier and harder. On the one hand, its purpose is clearly to 
ensure the reputation of the administration of justice. On the other hand, 
the measures necessary to ensure the good repute of the administration 
of justice are by no means clear; absent judicial interpretation such 
measures admit virtually any interpretation. That the judiciary in 
Canada can rely upon the wording of s. 24(2) to justify their decisions 
tends to veil their underlying intentions in applying the section, rather 
than revealing them. 
Aside from avoiding disrepute to the administration of justice, the 
most obvious purpose of s. 24(2), as it has been interpreted, is to ensure 
a fair trial. This is consistent with the explicit provision of s. 11 ( d) of the 
Charter which constitutionally mandates a fair trial by an independent 
and impartial tribunal. 97 
Most interestingly, s. 24(2) jurisprudence also demonstrates an un-
derlying concern for deterring police misconduct, although this ratio-
nale is less clearly stated. This is indicated by judicial concern for the 
mental state of the violating state authorities (i.e. good or bad faith). 
While it has been suggested that the mental state of the law enforcement 
authorities who obtain the violative evidence is significant under s. 
24(2) analysis because it would constitute judicial condonation of the 
improper police practices,98 this is clearly not the complete story. This 
point was brought to the fore by Iacobucci J. 's comments in R. v. 
Burlingham:99 
... we should never lose sight of the fact that even a person accused of 
the most heinous crimes, and no matter the likelihood that he or she 
actually committed those crimes, is entitled to the full protection of the 
Charter. Short-cutting or short-circuiting those rights affects not only 
the accused but also the entire reputation of the criminal justice 
system. It must be emphasized that the goals of preserving the integ-
rity of the criminal justice system as well as promoting the decency of 
investigatOJy techniques are of jimdamental importance in applying s. 
24(2).100 
While the Canadian approach to the exclusion of improperly ob-
tained evidence has been lauded for striking a compromise between the 
97 Charter, supra note 74. 
98 Stribopoulos, '"Lessons, supra note 75 at 124. 
99 Burlingham, supra note 85. 
100 Burlingham, supra note 85 at para. 50 [emphasis added]. 
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extreme positions taken on the exclusion of improperly obtained evi-
dence in other common law countries, its judicial interpretation lacks 
the kind of precision that would allow for more predictable and consis-
tent application. Clearly, s. 24(2) can never be used to create an absolute 
exclusionary rule; it necessarily imports a proportionality analysis. 
However, by developing more explicitly the competing reasons behind 
the rule such as balancing deterrence of police misconduct with the 
public's interest in seeing reliable evidence admitted - the Court would 
go a long way towards providing guidance to lawyers and law enforce-
ment. Moreover, to the extent that deterring police misconduct is a 
relevant factor, it would undoubtedly be beneficial to make this factor 
more explicit. It remains to be seen whether Canada will develop an 
approach to s. 24(2) which brings more tangible concerns than the 
reputation of the administration of justice to the fore. 
iii. United States 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States' Constitution provides 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures and sets out the 
minimum requirements for granting a search warrant. IOI The require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment apply to prosecutions at both the state 
and federal level, although states are free to provide for more expansive 
search and seizure protections in their own constitutions. Io2 The appro-
priate remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment is the exclusion 
of the evidence from the trial, subject to a few limited exceptions. Io3 
Generally, the onus is on the defendant to show a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and a factual connection to the impugned evidence, on a 
balance of probabilities. The prosecution must then establish an appli-
cable exception to the exclusionary rule. Io4 
Notwithstanding that the Fourth Amendment was enacted in 1791, 
the general exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
101 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
102 McCormick on Evidence vol. I, supra note 4 at 591. 
103 McCormick 011 Evidence vol. I, supra note 4 at 586-588. 
104 A higher burden may be placed on the prosecution in certain cases or by state law: J.W. 
Strong ed., McCormick on Evidence, 5'11 ed., vol. I (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, J 992) at 
765-767 [McCormick 011 Evidence vol. I ( 1992)]. 
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Amendment is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States. It is 
only since the early 20111 century that the remedy of exclusion has been 
mandated for prosecutions by the federal government, and not until 
1961 did the United States Supreme Court determine that state prosecu-
tions are bound by the same exclusionary rule when the Fourth Amend-
ment is violated. 105 
The broad exclusionary rule used to remedy Fourth Amendment 
violations in the United States has been implemented because of the 
"obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection 
of other mechanisms."106 Yet this does not explain the ultimate purpose 
of the rule, i.e. how the protections of the Fourth Amendment are to be 
applied. 
Since its inception in the early 2Qth century the primary purpose of 
the exclusionary rule in the United States has been to deter police 
officers from engaging in illegal conduct. In practice, to a lesser extent, 
the exclusionary rule also serves an educative function in teaching 
police about the seriousness with which society protects legal rights in 
the hopes of subtly influencing the value systems and practices of law 
enforcement. 107 The deterrence rationale was expressly recognized in 
United States v. Calandra108 and in subsequent decisions. 109 This under-
lying purpose is illustrated in the interpretation of the exclusionary rule 
and the exceptions to it. 
The rationale of deterring illegal police conduct finds practical 
manifestation in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. This rule 
excludes any evidence which is obtained as a factual consequence of a 
Fourth Amendment violation. 110 In the past this doctrine has been ap-
105 McCormick on Evidence vol. l, supra note 4 at 585-587; for federal application see Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385 (I 920); for state application see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ). Note that the general 
exclusionary rule necessarily applies only where a violation of the federal constitution is made 
out; the exclusionary remedy is not mandated by the United States' Constitution where only a 
state constitution which provides for more expansive protections than the Fourth Amendment 
is violated: see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
106 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1961) at 652 cited in supra note 4 at 587 § 166, 
107 W.R. Lafave et. al., Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, vol. I (St. 
Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 1987) at 16. 
108 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
10" Stribopoulos, "Lessons, supra note 75 at 100-101. 
110 McCormick 011 Evidence vol. l, supra note 4 at 614-615. 
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plied liberally. For example, in Murray v. United States 111 the United 
States Supreme Court held that even if there exists sufficient evidence 
prior to an illegal search and seizure to show cause for a warrant, where 
the decision to engage in the subsequent legal search has been influ-
enced by the prior illegal search, the fruits of both will be excluded. 112 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to limit the extent 
of this doctrine. In particular, the Court has rejected a strict "but for" 
doctrine in determining whether a constitutional violation results in the 
collection of evidence. In New York v. Harris 113 the comt allowed the 
admission of a statement made by an accused where the accused had 
been arrested in his home without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. It was not contested that the arrest was legal and the police 
had probable cause for the arrest and grounds for a warrant. The Court 
allowed the admission of the statement on the grounds that, while it was 
the factual consequence of illegal police actions, it was not the product 
of the illegality. 114 
Although the full implications of Harris are not yet clear, the 
"fruits" doctrine still appears to be intact in the case of most Fourth 
Amendment violations. 115 Regardless of the exact extent of the doctrine, 
its existence is testament to the deterrence rationale; it serves to dis-
suade desperate law enforcement officers from engaging in illegal 
searches in the hopes that, while the products of that search will be 
excluded, the illegal evidence obtained may lead to other sources of 
information, which can be legally exploited. 
The deterrence rationale also explains one of the important excep-
tions to the application of the exclusionary rule: the "inevitable discov-
ery" doctrine. That doctrine holds that, notwithstanding a causal link 
between a Fourth Amendment violation and the evidence obtained, 
illegally obtained evidence will be admissible if the prosecution can 
show that the evidence would inevitably have been found, absent the 
illegal search. 116 In keeping with the rationale behind the exclusionary 
rule, some courts have ruled it inapplicable in certain cases where it 
111 487 u .s. 533 (l 988). 
112 McCormick on Evidence - vol. 1 ( 1992), supra note 104 at 722. 
113 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
114 Ibid. at paras. 9-15. 
115 McCormick 011 Evidence vol. 1, supra note 4 at 616-617. 
116 McCormick 011 Evidence vol. 1, supra note 4 at 625-627. 
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would undermine the justification for the exception. For example, in 
cases where wan-ants are carried out without proper announcement, the 
illegally obtained evidence would almost always have inevitably been 
discovered if the warrant had been properly performed. Yet the desire to 
deter illegal conduct would be undermined by allowing the admission of 
the evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine, as it would not 
deter the police from using illegal means. 117 
Taken to its logical extension, the rationale of deterring police 
misconduct would sometimes allow the admission of illegally obtained 
evidence which was believed by the police to be obtained legally. This 
forms the basis for the most controversial of the exceptions to exclusion: 
the "good faith" doctrine. The reasoning behind this exception is that 
exclusion serves no deten-ent function where the police reasonably 
believe in the legality of their search. 118 The doctrine is misleading 
because the mistake as to the legality of their actions only has to be 
reasonable, not subjectively in "good faith." 119 The reasoning has been 
applied to cases where the police rely on a defective warrant120 or an 
unconstitutional statute. 121 It appears that this exception only applies 
where the police rely upon an outside authority, such as a search warrant 
or statute, but not to other violative searches undertaken in objective 
"good faith." This reflects the fact that the deterrence rationale would be 
undennined by too broad a "good faith" exception which encompassed 
any reasonable mistake of law as to the constitutionality of a violative 
search (for example, for a search following a "good faith" illegal deten-
tion).122 
Another interesting exception to the exclusionary rule is the admis-
sibility of illegally obtained evidence for the purposes of impeaching the 
testimony of the defendant. 123 Where the defendant chooses to take the 
stand and gives testimony inconsistent with the illegally obtained evi-
117 McCormick on Evidence vol. I (1992), supra note I 04 at 744; State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 
724 P.2d 545 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1986) 
118 McCormick on Evidence vol. I, supra note 4 at 628-631; United States v. Leon (1984), 
468 U.S. 897 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
119 McCormick 011 Evidence vol. l, supra note 4 at 628. 
120 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
121 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
122 McCormick on Evidence - vol. l, supra note 4 at 630-634; State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1987). 
123 McCormick on Evidence - vol. 1, supra note 4 at 632-634. 
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dence, the prosecution is entitled to challenge the assertions of the 
defendant by introducing the illegally obtained evidence. While this 
exception only arises where the defendant testifies 124 on a matter which 
is contradicted by the illegally obtained evidence, statements made in 
cross-examination are subject to contradiction under this exception, so 
long as the questioning is within the scope of the defendant's direct 
examination. 125 
The rationale for this exception is that the secondary use of illegal 
evidence is unlikely to reduce the deterrent effect of the general exclu-
sionary rule. 126 Also, this exception is considered to support an impor-
tant value which counters the value of deterring illegal police conduct; 
that is, perjmy is an offence against the administration of justice, and the 
courts should not sanction the use of perjury as a defence against 
criminal charges. 127 A final important limitation on this exception is 
reliability. McCormick observes that evidence admitted under this ex-
ception is allowed because it is highly probative to determining the 
accuracy of the defendant's version of events. When the illegality at 
issue threatens the reliability of the evidence, it will not necessarily be 
permissible to use the illegally obtained evidence to impeach the defen-
dant.128 
A recent exception to the exclusionary rule that has developed 
occurs where there is an intervening illegal act by the accused. 129 This 
arose in a Fourth Amendment context in Holmes v. State 130 where the 
suspect's car was illegally searched. In response to the illegal search the 
suspect grabbed the contraband and placed it in his mouth. The evidence 
was admitted to prove the accused's possession of the contraband both 
before and after the illegal act because of the suspect's criminal effort to 
124 The Supreme Court of the United States in a 5-4 decision in James v. ll!inois, 493 U.S. 307 
(1990) narrowly decided against extending the impeachment exception to allow the prosecu-
tion to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach any defence witness who provides testimony 
contradicted by the impugned evidence. 
125 McCormick on Evidence- vol. I, supra note 4 at 633. 
126 McCormick on Evidence - vol. I (1992), supra note 104 at 757. 
127 McCormick on Evidence - vol. 1 ( 1992), supra note 104 at 753-61. 
128 McCormick on Evidence - vol. I (1992), supra note 104 at 759; this tends to arise in cases 
of confession where the illegally obtained statement is often challenged as being unreliable as 
well are constitutionally violative, and therefore of too limited probative value to warrant 
exception from the exclusionary rule. 
129 McCormick on Evidence vol. 1, supra note 4 at 623-624. 
130 962 S.W.2d 663 (Tex.App. Waco 1998). 
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destroy the evidence. 131 This decision may reflect a serious weakening 
of the exclusionary rule, although its full impact remains unclear. 
The final exception to the exclusionary rule essentially imposes a 
limitation on the applicability of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." It is 
said that in certain cases the taint from an illegal search becomes 
sufficiently attenuated that the impugned evidence becomes admis-
sible.132 It is important to note that, unlike the inevitable discovery 
exception, this exception is not premised on challenging the causal link 
between the impugned evidence and the constitutional breach. Although 
the distinction between attenuation of taint and arguments of no causal 
link between the impugned evidence and the illegal search is often 
confused, McCormick states that these are clearly two different analy-
ses. 133 
On its face, the attenuation of taint doctrine is probably the most 
philosophically unjustifiable exception to the exclusionary rule, given 
the underlying deterrence rationale. In the context of evidence obtained 
illegally from searches, the attenuation of taint doctrine, in particular, 
would seem to undennine the purpose of the exclusionary rule. The 
existence of this exception is perhaps more understandable when it is 
considered that most cases invoking this exception involve confessions 
following illegal arrests, where the conduct of the accused some time 
after the wrongful police action is seen to interrupt the causal chain of 
events which follows from the illegal detention. 134 
This exception is perhaps most significant in the context of Fourth 
Amendment violations in that it reveals the limits of the exclusionary 
rule. It seems to recognize that as the illegal police action becomes more 
and more remote from the impugned evidence, the balance between 
accurate fact-finding and deterring police conduct begins to shift to-
wards allowing admission. While theoretically interesting, the use of 
this rule is still problematic, and its application to Fourth Amendment 
violations is uncertain. 
131 Discussed in lvfcCormick on Evidence - vol. I, supra note 4 at 624. 
132 McCormick 011 Evidence vol. I, supra note 4 at 621-623. 
133 McCormick on Evidence vol. I ( 1992), supra note I 04 at 734. 
134 McCormick 011 Evidence - vol. I (1992), supra note I 04 at 734-35. 
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2. Civilian Jurisdictions 
In civilian jurisdictions the major structural barrier to the exclusion of 
evidence from a search and seizure is the unitary judicial structure, 
(discussed above), which would require both professional judges and 
lay jurors to disregard highly probative, illegally obtained evidence. 
Notwithstanding the significance attributed to this factor in mitigating 
against categorical exclusionary rules in the context of evidence ex-
cluded because it is believed it would tend to impede the fact-finding 
process, this does not seem to be a major factor in determining the 
admissibility of search and seizure evidence. Contrary to the assertions 
of a large body of Anglo-American scholarship, exclusionary rules are 
enforced in Continental Europe in some cases with interesting varia-
tions in both their f01m and applicability. 
i. Germany 
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a relatively recent devel-
opment in Gennany. Unlike France, Germany did not have a doctrine of 
nullity which might allow the exclusion of such evidence. 135 In fact, the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in Germany dates from the 
1950s. 136 However, German law has only recently been clarified, such 
that Pakter's article from 1985 is still somewhat speculative when it 
notes that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence seems to be the 
law in Germany. 137 
As a result of its recent development, the German exclusionary rule 
owes much to the American model. The operations of the rule in 
Germany and the U.S. share many superficial similarities: both are said 
to apply an exclusionary rule, a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, 
135 Walter Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany and Italy" (1985), 9 Hastings Int'! 
and 
Comp. L. Rev. 1 at 17 [Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules"]. 
136 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 17-20. 
137 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 48; compare with M.C.D. Embregts, 
"Similarities and Differences: the Operation of the Exclusionary Rule in the US, Germany and 
the Netherlands" in C.M. Breur et. al., eds., New Trends in Criminal Investigation and 
Evidence, (Oxford: lntersentia, 2000) at 219 [Embregts, "Operations"]. 
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and an "attenuation of taint" rule. 138 However, notwithstanding these 
broad similarities, there are some observable differences which point to 
both different purposes for the rules and different conceptions of the 
nature of infringement. 139 
One major difference is that Germany essentially has two separate 
rules for exclusion: evidence obtained by brutality or deceit, and evi-
dence excluded to preserve judicial integrity and rule of law. 140 Evi-
dence which is obtained under the fonner category is summarily ex-
cluded, without regard to its probative value. However, the force of this 
exclusionary rule is tempered by the fact that the legality of a search and 
of a seizure is detennined separately, i.e. an illegal search does not 
necessarily make a seizure following that search illegal. 141 The result is 
that the apparently robust exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by 
brutality or deceit is of limited use. 142 Interestingly, the odd application 
of this exclusionaiy rule may be tied to the purpose behind it: it is 
intended to preserve judicial integrity rather than deter the police. 143 The 
result seems to be that even the merely technical distinction between the 
fruits of a search and a seizure allows a sufficient divide that the 
judiciary can admit the evidence without compromising the integrity of 
the judiciary, notwithstanding that the rule obviously has very little 
deterrent effect. 
Evidence excluded to preserve judicial integrity and the rule of law 
is very different from that excluded under the former category. It is 
concerned with protecting the privacy rights of citizens and balancing 
those rights against the goal that law enforcement be able to effectively 
prosecute crime. Unlike other jurisdictions, exclusion under this rule is 
not premised upon illegality. 144 The emphasis under this type of exclu-
sion is protecting the constitutionally entrenched principles of invio-
138 Embregts, "Operations", supra note 137 at 219-220. 
139 While this paper is decidedly not concerned with examining what makes a search illegal or 
unconstitutional in the various jurisdictions, in this case the difference is significant to the 
operation of exclusionary rule. The reader must tolerate this methodological deviation to 
properly understand the operation of the German rule. 
14° C.M. Bradley, "The Exclusionary Rule in Germany" (1982-1983), 96 Harv. L .Rev. 1032 at 
I 034 [Bradley, "Germany"]. 
141 Ibid. at 1040-1041. 
142 Ibid. at 1040. 
143 Bradley, "Germany", supra note 140 at 1035. 
144 Bradley, "Germany", supra note 140 at 1041. 
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lable human dignity (Art. 1), free development of personality (art. 2), 
and the inviolability of the home (Art. 13). 145 
Unlike the American approach, where the emphasis in determining 
admissibility is on the means of procuring the evidence, the Germans 
recognize a class of evidence which is inadmissible both because of the 
means necessary to obtain it and its content; indeed, it would appear that 
these fields merge in this class of evidence. This type of evidence is 
labelled "unobtainable", and it arises where the privacy right of the 
individual outweighs the interest of the state in its seizure. 146 
In analyzing allegedly unobtainable evidence there are three catego-
ries: truly unobtainable evidence, evidence subject to balancing with 
state interests, and evidence with no protection. Truly unobtainable 
evidence is absolutely protected, and not subject to balancing with other 
compelling interests. 147 In one case, an accidentally taped phone conver-
sation between a husband and wife was excluded when their legally 
tapped phone was inadvertently left off the hook and recorded their 
private conversation. 148 
The second type of unobtainable evidence requires the balancing of 
state interest against individual privacy interests. For example a diary 
given to police by a private citizen was excluded because the state 
interest was not sufficient to outweigh the individual's privacy rights 
under Arts. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 149 The Court held that the 
balancing would likely have come out the other way if the diary had 
recorded the felonies of a criminal or a foreign agent's diary entries 
concerning his spying activities. 150 
The final class of evidence receives no protection. It arises in cases 
where there is no individual privacy interest under the constitution. This 
arises, for example, in cases of business records. 151 
The significance of this exclusionary rule is that it provides a strong 
process for protecting privacy rights. Rather than focussing on the 
government agent, German law very strongly recognizes privacy rights 
i-15 Cited in Bradley, ·'Germany", supra note 140 at 1037. 
1-16 Bradley, "Germany"', supra note 140 at 1041-1042. 
147 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 44. 
i-is Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 44-45. 
149 Bradley, "Germany"', supra note 140 at 1042. 
1.io Bradley, ·'Germany"', supra note 140 at 1043. 
151 Bradley, ·'Germany"', supra note 140 at l 043. 
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as the rights of the individual, deserving of protection regardless of th( 
means of infringement. While the German model does not provide 
robust protections against illegal police action as some other jurisdic-
tions, it does provide much stronger protections of personal privacy 
where the impugned evidence would undermine the integrity and 
personhood of the individual whose possessions have been seized. 
ii. France 
France has perhaps the oldest exclusionary doctrine of any of the 
countries surveyed here. The sanctity of the domicile is an important 
protection in French law, and has been subject to legal protection since 
at least the French Revolution. 152 The exclusion of evidence obtained 
through illegal searches of a domicile - termed nullification occurred 
as early as 1910, and perhaps even earlier. 153 
Since 1953, nullification has been the standard response to searches 
performed with insufficient warrants, and confessions which were made 
as a result of evidence obtained through an illegal search have also been 
subject to exclusion under a strong derivative evidence or "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" rule. 154 While nullification is used to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence, it is noteworthy that exclusion is apparently discre-
tionary, 155 seemingly based on balancing "public policy and the good 
administration of justice" against the "rights of the defence." 156 
For a time there was suspicion that the flagrant delit provision of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure had obviated the need for warrants in 
searches of domiciles where the crime was "flagrant". However, the 
Court of Cassation held in 1980 that a warrant is always required to 
search a domicile, notwithstanding the presence of significant pre-
search or post-search evidence or "hot pursuit" by the police. 157 "Good 
faith" by the police has not been considered an important factor in 
152 Pakter, ''Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 34. 
153 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 34-35. 
1°' Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 35. 
155 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 36. 
156 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 36-3, n. 264. 
157 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 36. 
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rnsessing the legality of a search or the admissibility of the fruits of that 
;earch. 158 
Notwithstanding this apparently strong exclusionary rule, the exclu-
:>ion of illegally obtained evidence in France is rare. One possible reason 
for this rarity is that the unitary judicial structure brings to the fore the 
iifficulty of asking the criminal tribunal to disregard reliable and com-
pelling evidence of guilt. 159 A more obvious reason is that illegal 
:;earches are exceedingly uncommon. While the police require a valid 
warrant to conduct a search, the police are allowed to use blank warrants 
which do not specify the name of the person or place to be searched. 160 
As a result, the warrant requirement places only the smallest technical 
obligation on the police to secure prior judicial authorization for a 
search. 
The apparent lack of development of the law in France for the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence suggests that these violations 
are either rarely brought to light - which seems unlikely given the 
apparently sturdy exclusionary rule in force or rarely committed, 
which seems more likely given the minimal technical requirements for 
obtaining a warrant to justify a search. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The exclusion of relevant evidence occurs in dramatically different 
contexts depending on whether the evidence is excluded because of 
concerns that it will distort the fact-finding process or because it is 
excluded for reasons extraneous to fact-finding. The exclusion of evi-
dence in the former categ01y is a defining characteristic of the common 
law system. It is easy for the common law lawyer to cite the apparently 
unrestrained admissibility of such evidence in civil law jurisdictions as a 
source of the superi01ity of the common law method over the civilian 
method. However, such a view is narrow in that it fails to consider the 
functional and structural differences in civilian trials which mitigate 
158 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 37. 
159 Damaska, "Evidentiary Barriers", supra note 5 at 524. 
160 Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules", supra note 135 at 35. 
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against the use or reliance on such evidence. In this respect, while the 
difference between the common law and civilian approaches to the 
exclusion of this type of evidence should not be understated, the effect 
on the fairness of the proceedings can easily be overestimated. The 
example used in this paper, the use of hearsay or derivative evidence, 
illustrates that while substantive differences certainly do exist between 
the civilian and common law jurisdictions, similar goals are often ac-
complished by different means. This is undoubtedly an important lesson 
for any researcher involved in comparative legal scholarship. 
In the context of evidence excluded for reasons extraneous to truth 
finding it is interesting how unimportant the civil law/common law 
distinction is. Differences in this type of exclusion are closely attribut-
able to the policy goals of the judiciary and legislature and the 
judiciary's assigned role, or perception of that role, in enforcing those 
policies. Fundamentally, these exclusions reflect the recognition of 
policy values with priority over accurate truth finding. The variance 
across national boundaries is perhaps then not surprising, nor is the lack 
of correlation between the type of legal system used and the exclusion-
ary rules that exist. This type of exclusion reflects the relevance of 
national variation, even within a legal system (i.e. common law or civil 
law) and reflects the possibility of looking outside one's own legal 
system for guidance on the development of exclusions geared towards 
policies extraneous to truth-finding. 
